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ABSTRACT: This article addresses the motives behind General
George Patton slapping two soldiers in Army field hospitals during
the Sicily campaign. With a more comprehensive understanding of
the evolution of mental health conditions associated with combat
trauma, the complexities of battlefield leadership become clearer.

O

n a hot August day in 1943 along the northern Sicilian coast,
Lieutenant General George Patton slapped a soldier. Arriving
at the 15th Evacuation Hospital for an inspection, the general
moved along the ward. There he met “the only arrant coward” Patton
claimed to have seen in his army “sitting, trying to look as if he had been
wounded.” When Patton asked about his injury the soldier replied he
“just couldn’t take it.” As one of the doctors remembered, “The General
immediately flared up, cursed the soldier, called him all types of a coward,
then slapped him across the face with his gloves, and finally grabbed the
soldier by the scruff of his neck and kicked him out of the tent.”1 A week
later, Patton repeated the scene at the 93rd Evacuation Hospital (also in
Sicily) where he slapped another seemingly uninjured private.2
These episodes, collectively known as the slapping incidents, are
among the most well-known facts about Patton’s career. Yet little is
known about what Patton actually knew about shell shock. Most of his
contemporaries, and subsequent historians, simply claim the general did
not believe it existed. Dwight D. Eisenhower, for example, wrote Patton
“sincerely believed that there was no such thing as true ‘battle fatigue’ or
‘battle neurosis.’ ”3 And in General Omar N. Bradley’s opinion, Patton
“could not believe that men could break under an intense mental strain
as a result of [the] hardships endured in war.”4 Patton’s daughter, Ruth
Ellen Patton Totten, agreed her father “honestly did not believe in battle
fatigue,” while his nephew Fred Ayer Jr. claimed throughout Patton’s

The author would like to thank Professor Ronald Spector, Professor Ingo Trauschweizer, and Major
Jeffrey Mills (US Army) as well as the peer reviewers who assisted in the development of this article
      1      Diary, August 3, 1943, box 3, George S. Patton Papers (GSPP), Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Bess to Eisenhower, August 19, 1943, Report, box 91, PrePresidential, 1916–52, Principal File (PPPF), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Kansas; and Long
to the Surgeon NATOUSA, “Mistreatment of Patients in Receiving Tents of the 15th and 93rd
Evacuation Hospital,” August 16, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
2      Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940–1945 (Boston: Da Capo, 1974), 331.
3      Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1949),
179–80.
4      Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1951), 162.
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“career he wrote, and told to all who would listen, that there was no
excuse for what was once called ‘shell-shock.’ ”5
Scholars have generally agreed. Two prominent examples include
historian Carlo D’Este, who wrote that Patton “believed that there
was no such thing as ‘combat fatigue,’ and those who claimed to suffer
from it were there only to shirk combat duty,” and historian Dennis
Showalter, who noted Patton believed “battle fatigue was a euphemism
for cowardice.”6 The 1970 movie Patton gave voice to this opinion when
the general says “there will be no battle fatigue in my command . . .
Battle fatigue is a free ride . . . I am not going to subsidize cowardice.” 7
Nevertheless, a search of the general’s extensive diaries,
correspondence, and writings cannot produce a single reliable statement
from Patton claiming shell shock was not an authentic medical
condition. Instead, a more complicated understanding of shell shock
emerges. Between the two slapping incidents, Patton encountered other
soldiers whom he acknowledged were suffering from shell shock. The
reason for the different reactions was Patton’s adherence to an older
definition of shell shock from his experience in World War I that
viewed total immobilization as the only acceptable symptom requiring
hospitalization. Any lesser attack of nerves was normal fear and should
be dealt with at the unit level. As Patton wrote after the war,
The greatest weapon against the so-called battle fatigue is ridicule. If soldiers
would realize that a large proportion of men allegedly suffering from battle
fatigue are really using an easy way out, they would be less sympathetic.
Any man who says he has battle fatigue is avoiding danger and forcing on
those who have more hardihood than himself the obligation of meeting
it. If soldiers would make fun of those who begin to show battle fatigue,
they would prevent its spread, and also save the man who allows himself to
malinger by this means from an afterlife of humiliation and regret.8

If a soldier were able to communicate, Patton did not believe the
stage for hospitalization had yet been reached. Though he understood
the strain battle put on the human psyche, he also knew it was the
commander’s job to maintain fighting strength. Victory, not to mention
shorter casualty lists, depended on keeping soldiers at the front. Likewise,
Patton’s actions were probably sparked by reports of troops malingering
in hospitals immediately before the slapping incidents.9 It is therefore
more likely Patton did not strike the two soldiers because he thought
they were shell-shocked, but rather because he believed they were using
the hospitals to escape the front.
5      Ruth Ellen Totten (lecture, Topsfield Historical Society, 1974), quoted in George Forty, Patton’s
Third Army At War (London: Arms and Armour, 1978), 62; and Fred Ayer Jr., Before the Colors Fade: A
Portrait of a Soldier George S. Patton Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), 136.
6      Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 534; and Dennis
Showalter, Patton and Rommel, Men of War in the Twentieth Century (New York: Berkley Caliber,
2005), 314.
7      Patton, directed by Franklin J. Schaffner (1970; Twentieth Century Fox).
8      George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Bantam Books, 1947), 322.
9      Jack Kneece, “A Soldier’s Story Takes,” Washington Star, n.d., folder 19, box 23, GSPP.
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What one general thought about shell shock may appear of little
importance in the wider events of World War II. Yet it parallels other
important issues of command and for the armed forces. This scandal
demonstrates how military needs and changing medical knowledge
can clash. Though the maladies are very different, past discussions of
shell shock resemble today’s issues arising from post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). Both are complicated psychological problems that sap
the Army’s strength. The definitions of both conditions also expanded
during war.
Patton’s understanding of shell shock was shared by much of
the US Army’s leadership during the period. Patton and many of his
contemporaries saw shell shock in black and white terms. If a soldier were
truly shell-shocked, he lost control of his actions. Anything less than this
was cowardice, normal fear, or fatigue that could be corrected outside a
hospital to keep soldiers at the front, preventing greater casualties and
lost battles. For this reason, many generals determined they could not
be too harsh on hospitalized soldiers. Patton was unique in his actions,
not his opinions.
Any revisionism of such a controversial incident runs the risk of
appearing to defend Patton’s behavior. However, this article suggests
Patton’s motives were shared by his peers who held similar views of
shell shock that have often been overlooked by historians. By examining
Patton’s writings, his belief in the existence of shell shock becomes evident
and his actions as deliberate attempts to end malingering become clear.
Though this paper can only briefly touch on shell shock, a short history
of the changes surrounding it provides context for Patton’s actions.
Shell shock was first diagnosed during World War I and was associated
with symptoms such as blindness, paralysis, and problems with hearing,
speech, and memory.10 Yet well before World War II, the term, and the
theory that it was caused by concussion, had fallen out of medical use
and been replaced with psychoneurosis. The term shell shock, however,
remained in popular use. By the beginning of World War II, one study
characterized shell shock as consisting of emotional problems, cognitive
disorders, physical complaints, and manifestations of hysteria.11 Another
leading study, likely read by Patton, listed the basic symptoms as hysteria,
neurasthenia, and “graver temporary ‘mental’ disorder.”12
Psycholog y for the Fighting Man, referred to shell shock as “war neuroses”
and listed the symptoms as blindness, loss of control in limbs, loss of
memory “and everything connected with his [the soldier’s] identity.”13 As
historian Hans Binneveld observed, the symptoms had not significantly
changed between the two World Wars, but the willingness of soldiers
10      Hans Binneveld, From Shell Shock to Combat Stress: A Comparative History of Military Psychiatry,
trans. John O’Kane (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997), 85.
11      Binneveld, Shell Shock to Combat Stress, 94.
12      Charles S. Myers, Shell Shock in France, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1940), 25.
13      Edwin G. Boring, Psychology for the Fighting Man (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal, 1943), 319.
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to admit fear and anxiety was much more common in the Second.14
Terminology evolved from “combat exhaustion” or “battle fatigue” to
the point that the US Army in the Mediterranean initially assigned all
psychiatric cases with the category of “exhaustion.”15 Thus, by the time
of the slapping incidents, all patients with psychological problems were
labeled with exhaustion and associated with shell shock even when they
did not have disabling symptoms. Thus, the tacitly expanded definition
of shell shock was unfamiliar to officers, such as Patton, and soldiers,
including those with less severe psychological ailments.
Patton recalled his first painful experience with shell shock while
defending his actions in 1943. During World War I, one of his friends
had broken down under the strain of combat “in an exactly analogous
manner” with those of the two soldiers he struck in Sicily. “Both my
friend,” Patton claimed later, “and the medical men with whom I
discussed his case assured me that had he been roughly checked at the
time of his first misbehavior, he would have been restored to a normal
state.”16 It has not been possible to determine if the story was true, or if
Patton was simply attempting to defend himself. But the insight helps
explain his actions in the field hospitals in Sicily.
Languishing in the interwar Army, Patton dedicated considerable
time to reading and writing about warfare. In 1927, he published
“Why Men Fight.” The essay did not mention shell shock, but it did
discuss why soldiers avoided combat.17 Though he admitted skulking
could be the result of “nervous collapse caused by fatigue,” Patton
made no differentiation between this reason and others for avoiding
the battlefield. Nor did he make any distinction when reasoning the
execution of skulkers was not for the crime of avoiding combat out of
mere fear “but for [the] betrayal of [one’s] comrades.” Patton believed
if small unit officers and noncommissioned officers took appropriate
measures, referred to as “battle discipline,” skulking would be drastically
reduced.18 But he noted few leaders had the courage to use them.19
Patton also expressed an interest in shell shock. On March 19, 1941,
he wrote to the Infantry Journal requesting to purchase Shell Shock in France
1914–1918 by Charles S. Myers, which was a detailed medical study of
shell shock during World War I.20 Though it is unknown if Patton ever
read the book, Myers made several recommendations consistent with
Patton’s actions in Sicily.21 In a section on malingering, Myers wrote on
rare occasions malingerers would pretend to be shell-shocked, adding
14      Binneveld, Shell Shock to Combat Stress, 94.
15      Calvin S. Drayer and Albert J. Glass, “Introduction,” Neuropsychiatry in World War II, vol. 2,
ed. William S. Mullins and Albert J. Glass (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973), 9–10.
16      Patton to Eisenhower, letter, August 29, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
17      George S. Patton Jr., “Why Men Fight,” Patton Society, accessed July 1, 2019.
18      Patton, War as I Knew It, 382.
19      Patton, “Why Men Fight.”
20      George S. Patton Jr. to Infantry Journal, letter, March 19, 1941, folder 5, box 26, GSPP.
21      Patton was a confirmed scribbler in his vast military library, bequeathed to the Military
Academy Library at West Point. But Shell Shock in France was not donated. Elaine McConnell
(librarian, United States Military Academy Library), email message to author, February 11, 2013.
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sometimes the attempts were subconscious and could be avoided by
keeping suspected malingerers separate from other patients.22 Myers also
stated, “The infliction of pain [to shell-shocked patients] is only justifiable
in cases of long-standing neglect or of suspected malingering.”23 Patton
demanded the two soldiers in Sicily be immediately removed from the
hospitals after he used physical force. If nothing else, Patton’s interest
in Myers’s book suggests he acknowledged some form of shell shock
did exist.
As in 1918, Patton had few qualms about inflicting physical force to
motivate his soldiers. On November 9, 1942, Patton landed on a beach
outside Casablanca while commanding part of the Allied invasion of
North Africa. The scene was chaotic, and the general went about trying
to restore order. He wrote in his diary, “One soldier, who was pushing
a boat, got scared and ran onto the beach and assumed the Fields [sic]
position (pre-natal) and jabbered. I kicked him in the fanny with all my
might and he jumped right to and went to work. Some way to boost
morale.” Patton then “hit another man who was too lazy to push a
boat.”24 Since everyone on the beach was under fire, nobody thought to
question Patton’s actions. As his friend Major General Everett S. Hughes
reflected, Patton “had to boot men off the beach at Casablanca to get
them into the fight . . . He gets a [Distinguished Service Cross] for one
type of slapping or booting and jumped on for slapping them in the
hospital.”25 This irony was not lost on Patton.
As the commander of the Seventh Army in Sicily, Patton continued
to exert heavy pressure on his soldiers. The route along the northern
coast toward Messina was dominated by steep hills and narrow roads cut
into sheer cliffs. This terrain provided an excellent defensive position
for the Germans, who simply needed to destroy roads along the cliffs
to slow the American advance. Patton’s answer to this was to keep up
the pressure against the retreating enemy so they could not regroup or
complete demolitions.26 Competing with British General Bernard Law
Montgomery was another factor in Patton’s haste. As Patton wrote the
45th Division commander, “This is a horse race in which the prestige
of the US Army is at stake. We must take Messina before the British.”27
The relentless advance began to wear out the Seventh Army. Donald
V. Bennett, an artillery officer fighting in the 3rd Infantry Division,
recalled, “A significant number of men were wandering around behind
the lines, dodging MPs, and, when caught, claiming they were either
lost or their nerves had ‘cracked.’ ”28 A few days before the first slapping
22      Myers, Shell Shock in France, 40–41, 51.
23      Myers, Shell Shock in France, 59.
24      [Patton] diary, November 9, 1942, box 2, GSPP.
25      Everett Hughes to Kate Hughes, letter, August 17, 1943, box II 2, Everett Strait Hughes
Papers (ESHP), Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
26      [Patton] diary, appendix 48, July 18, 1943, box 2, GSPP.
27      Patton to Troy H. Middleton, letter, July 28, 1943, Patton Papers, quoted in Carlo D’Este,
Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, July–August 1943 (New York: Harper Perennial, 1988), 449.
28      Donald V. Bennett, Honor Untarnished: A West Point Graduate’s Memoir of World War II, with
William R. Forstchen (New York: Forge, 2003), 148.

84

Parameters 49(3) Autumn 2019

incident, Patton asked Major General Clarence R. Huebner how the 1st
Infantry Division was doing. Huebner replied the front line was getting
thinner, and, along with many legitimate casualties being treated at
field hospitals, there were some malingers from combat. “Well, as luck
would have it,” Huebner remembered years later, Patton decided to do
something about the problem.29
Early on August 3, 1943, Private Charles H. Kuhl was admitted
to the 15th Evacuation Hospital and received his third diagnosis of
exhaustion (fear): “He entered the hospital because of nervousness and
fear of noise from artillery; that he would work anywhere but could
not stand the front because it made his nerves raw”; he had no other
symptoms.30 At 12:15 p.m., the command car roared up to the hospital
and Patton hopped out. The hospital’s commander, Colonel F. Y. Leaver,
remembered showing Patton the patients: “He praised each . . . casualty
by shaking his hand or patting his head and telling him what a fine job
he had done in the war effort.”31 Then Patton came to Private Kuhl who
explained he “just couldn’t take it.” Patton wrote, “I gave him the devil,
slapped his face with my gloves and kicked him out of the hospital.
Companies should deal with such men and if they shirk their duty they
should be tried for cowardice and shot.”32 General John P. Lucas, who
was with Patton, remembered Kuhl explained he “wasn’t hurt, he was
nervous, and added that he had been to the front three times but couldn’t
stay there.” Lucas saw nothing unusual about Patton’s response.33 After
Kuhl’s forced departure, Patton calmly continued with the inspection.
As he was leaving, Patton praised the hospital and Leaver for the care
the wounded were receiving but added “a great many of those patients
that just ‘couldn’t take it’ were nothing more than cowards.”34 Kuhl was
later diagnosed with malarial fever and diarrhea.35
Two days later, Patton issued the following order:
It has come to my attention that a very small number of soldiers are going
to the hospital on the pretext that they are nervously incapable of combat.
Such men are cowards, and bring discredit on the Army and disgrace to their
comrades whom they heartlessly leave to endure the danger of battle while
they themselves use the hospital as a means of escaping.
You will take measures to see that such cases are not sent to the hospital, but
are dealt with in their units.
Those who are not willing to fight will be tried by Court Martial for
cowardice in the face of the enemy.36
29      Jack Kneece, “A Soldier’s Story Takes,” Washington Star, n.d., folder 19, box 23, GSPP.
30      “Exhibit ‘B’, ” September 14, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
31      F. Y. Leaver to Richard T. Arnest, letter, August 4, 1943, box 94, PPPF.
32      [Patton] Diary, August 3, 1943.
33      Diary, August 3, 1943, box 14, John P. Lucas Papers, US Army Heritage and Education
Center (USAHEC), Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
34      Leaver to Arnest, August 4, 1943.
35      “Exhibit ‘B.’ ”
36      Patton to Corps, Division, and Separate Brigade Commanders, “Memorandum,” August 5,
1943, box 91, folder Patton, George S., Jr. (4), PPPF.
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It should be observed neither in his departing comment to Leaver
or in the above order did Patton imply all soldiers suffering from shell
shock were cowards. He used the phrase “great many” as opposed to
“all” when warning Leaver about soldiers faking shell shock symptoms.
Likewise, the above order only refers to a “very small number of soldiers,”
even though shell shock was common in the Sicilian campaign.
Another important observation is Patton never claimed, either
at the field hospital or in his diary, shell shock was synonymous with
cowardice. At the time of his visit, nobody knew Kuhl had malaria and
his record of two previous stays seemed to suggest he was using the
hospital to escape the front. Likewise, Patton’s order did not mention
shell shock by any of its many names and simply stated being nervous
did not constitute a legitimate excuse for hospitalization.
The problem of soldiers using hospitals to escape the front, as
Patton surely knew, already had a well-documented history. Helping
wounded comrades to the rear or faking illnesses—favored methods
of malingerers during the American Civil War—eventually developed
such a stigma of cowardice that even genuinely sick soldiers would insist
on going into battle.37
During World War I, shell shock victims were so often assumed
to be malingerers the French military manual on the subject, The
Psychoneuroses of War, spent considerable space explaining the difference
between malingering and shell shock. Malingering was a “voluntary,
conscious act, willed and reasoned, an act which is intended to mislead
and deceive. . . . It is difficult for the malingerer to display a complete
imitation of a series of neuropathic manifestations such as contractures,
tremors, spasms, and certain affections of the gait.” The malingerer
often exaggerated the symptoms, and a few hours of observation were
usually enough for the malingerer to reveal himself.38
The US Army during World War II was not immune from this
problem. As historian Martin van Creveld explained, the Army took an
“extremely permissive attitude” toward shell shock that was
communicated to the troops by semiofficial channels and caused combat
fatigue to be regarded as a legitimate, almost normal complaint. While
preventing the army from applying the somewhat harsh methods of
treatment used by German physicians, this attitude also built golden bridges
for men who wanted to escape combat. There even exists evidence that, for
some soldiers at any rate, going AWOL, deserting and requesting evacuation
on psychiatric grounds constituted alternative courses of action.39

His knowledge of history, combined with Huebner’s report, likely
strengthened Patton’s idea to watch for skulkers in the hospitals. The
37      James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 8, 79.
38      Gustave Roussy and Jean Lhermitte, The Psychoneuroses of War, trans. Wilfred B. Christopherson
(London, University of London Press, 1918), xxxi–xxxv.
39      Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945 (Westport,
CT: Greenwood, 1982), 96–97.
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damage from shell shock to army strength during World War II could
often be permanent. Only five percent of psychiatric cases in the North
African campaign were returned to their units. Such a high attrition rate
forced the military to reevaluate its treatment of the condition.
Captain Frederick Hanson advocated that most shell shock came
from fatigue and that it should be treated with a short rest involving
good food and sleep.40 The result was a dramatic rise in the number of
soldiers returned to their units.41 Over time, these numbers continued to
improve, and in the campaigns in France and Germany, 90 out of every
100 exhaustion casualties were rehabilitated to some form of military
duty.42 Overall, an estimated 60 percent of shell shock casualties were
returned to combat during the war.43 Of the remainder, a large number
were reassigned to noncombatant jobs. Nevertheless, nearly a million
American servicemen received psychiatric treatment during World War
II.44 Creveld observes this number constituted 8.9 percent of those
who served in the Army during World War II and 43 million days of
service were lost. He adds the number of psychological casualties was
“about equal to that of all battle and non-battle wounds combined and
exceeded the number of those killed by a factor of about three to one.
At one time, indeed, more men were being discharged from the army
for psychiatric reasons than were added by induction.”45 Though the US
Army eventually rose to the problem, shell shock was still a major drain
on manpower.
The problem of treating shell-shocked soldiers was especially
complicated during the Sicilian campaign. The speed of the advance
caused many shell shock casualties to be evacuated directly to North
Africa instead of being treated closer to the front, which significantly
decreased their chances of recovery. Apart from the distance and the
reality of longer treatment often causing symptoms to worsen, it is also
possible some doctors purposefully delayed returning GI’s to combat.
“Having heard the soldier’s tales of battle,” historian Ben Shephard
observed, “they seldom had the heart to send him back to it.” The result
was that out of the Sicilian campaign, only 39 percent of neuropsychiatric
cases were returned to combat.46
The American high command was well aware of the problem of
separating malingerers from legitimate psychoneurotic cases. Writing
40      Hans Pols, “The Tunisian Campaign, War Neuroses, and the Reorientation of American
Psychiatry during World War II,” Harvard Review of Psychiatry 19, no. 6 (November/December 2011):
316.
41      Drayer and Glass, “Introduction,” 9, 10.
42      Stephen E. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the
Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944–May 7, 1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 330.
43      Creveld, Fighting Power, 95, 96.
44      Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (London: Michael Joseph, 1984),
246.
45      Creveld, Fighting Power, 95.
46      Drayer and Glass, “Introduction,” 13, 8; Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves: Soldiers and
Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 219; and Charles
M. Wiltse, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, 1965), 171–72.
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an unsent memorandum a few weeks after the slapping incident became
public, former Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall mused that once
a skulker reached a field hospital, his “potential value to the service is
either destroyed or seriously impaired. There he exchanges information
regarding his ailment with other patients and from them he learns the
symptoms most likely to perplex the doctors. He is recognized and
treated as a sick man. . . . Above all, he escapes from those duties which
he seeks to evade. He cannot be punished for malingering, therefore the
worst that can happen is to be sent back to his organization where he
can and will start the same process all over again.”47
Marshall believed the problem was exacerbated by officers wanting
to get rid of difficult soldiers by sending them to the hospital and by
medical personnel who would not turn away a man who claimed to
be sick. “No record exists of any psychoneurotic ever having been
convicted for malingering,” Marshall noted. “This is because no doctor
is either willing or able to state under oath that the pain complained of
by the psychoneurotic is nonexistent.”48 Privately, Eisenhower made a
similar observation, explaining “in any army one-third of the soldiers
are natural fighters and brave; two-thirds inherently are cowards and
skulkers. By making the two-thirds fear the possible public upbraiding
such as Patton gave during the [Sicily] campaign, the skulkers are forced
to fight.”49 Lucas, reflecting on the slapping incident, likewise believed,
“There are always a certain number of such weaklings in any Army. .
. . However, the man with malaria doesn’t pass his condition on to his
comrades as rapidly as does the man with cold feet nor does malaria have
the lethal effect” of malingering.50
British General Bernard Law Montgomery, Patton’s famous rival,
had the rumor of the slapping incidents suppressed in his Eighth Army
newspaper. As his biographer notes, if Montgomery had “known of
Patton’s hysterical outbursts in the two American field hospitals, he
would probably have had more sympathy with Patton than did Bradley,
Eisenhower, or the American division commanders.”51 The general
sentiment of much of the Allied high command was expressed by
General Curtis E. LeMay when a group of flight surgeons requested he
give his fliers a rest to prevent shell shock. “Gentlemen,” LeMay told the
doctors, “I know you are professionals but we are too. I don’t want you
to interfere with the way we’re running the war.”52
Thus, despite the endless criticism of the Seventh Army commander
after the slapping incidents, the US Army leadership was not far from
Patton’s thinking on what constituted shell shock and cowardice. As
Hughes noted, “What we used to consider as shell shock or what we
47      George C. Marshall, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 4, ed. Larry I. Bland (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 224.
48      Marshall, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, 222.
49      Harry C. Butcher, diary, August 21, 1943, box 167, PPPF.
50      [Lucas] diary, August 3, 1943.
51      Nigel Hamilton, Monty Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983),
374, 360.
52      Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 303.
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might now consider as cowards no longer exists. A commander now
is on the defensive, and is going to have difficulty in distinguishing
between a man who is yellow and a man who is mentally ill.”53
Hughes’s comment on the changing meaning of shell shock helps
clarify why Patton did not believe Kuhl was suffering from it. The day
after issuing the order to watch for malingers in hospitals, Patton visited
another field hospital and saw “two men completely out from shell
shock. One kept going through the motions of crawling. The doctor
told me they were going to give them an injection to put them to sleep
and that probably they would wake up alright.”54 What made Patton
think Kuhl was a coward, while these two men were suffering from
shell shock? Mostly it was a difference of definition and perception.
Kuhl was sitting up on a stool coherent enough to tell Patton he could
not take the front. The two other men were clearly stunned out of their
senses. The definition of shell shock that Patton and much of the US
Army leadership were familiar with was a soldier completely unable to
control his actions.
On the afternoon of August 10, Patton arrived at the 93rd Evacuation
Hospital. All went well until Patton spied Private Paul G. Bennett, who
was sitting up shivering. When Patton asked Bennett what was wrong
with him, the private began to cry and answered, “It’s my nerves.” “What
did you say?” demanded Patton. “It’s my nerves,” sobbed Bennett, “I
can’t stand the shelling anymore.” Patton slapped Bennett across the
face shouting, “Your nerves Hell, you are just a God damn coward, you
yellow son of a bitch.” The general’s voice was audible from outside the
tent as he continued, “Shut up that God damned crying. I won’t have
these brave men here who have been shot seeing a yellow bastard sitting
here crying.” Patton then slapped Bennett again hard enough to knock
off his helmet liner, which rolled into the next tent, and shouted toward
the receiving officer, “Don’t you admit this yellow bastard, theres [sic]
nothing the matter with him. I won’t have the hospitals cluttered up with
these sons of a bitches [sic] who haven’t the guts to fight.” Bennett was
managing to sit at attention as Patton turned back to him. “You’re going
back to the front lines,” the general growled, “and you may get shot and
killed but you’re going to fight. If you don’t, I’ll stand you up against a
wall and have a firing squad kill you on purpose.” Patton then reached
for one of his ivory handled pistols and continued, “I ought to shoot
you myself, you God damned whimpering coward.”55 Patton departed
still shouting about Bennett. “I may have saved his soul,” he wrote that
evening, “if he had one.”56
The surgeon general’s report of the slapping incidents arrived
at Eisenhower’s Headquarters two days before a delegation of war
53      Everett Hughes to Kate Hughes, letter, November 30, 1943, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
54      [Patton] diary, August 6, 1943, Box 3, GSPP.
55      Donald E. Currier to Arnest, report, “Visit of Lieutenant General Patton to the 93rd
Evacuation Hospital,” August 12, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
56      [Patton] diary, August 10, 1943, box 3, GSPP.
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correspondents who confirmed the story.57 Eisenhower wrote an
unofficial reprimand to Patton stating, “I clearly understand that firm
and drastic measures are at times necessary in order to secure desired
objectives. But this does not excuse brutality, abuse of the sick, nor
exhibition of uncontrollable temper in front of subordinates.”58 He then
ordered Patton to apologize to the two soldiers, along with the other
medical personnel, and quietly opened an investigation. Eisenhower
also requested the theater war correspondents not report the story since
Patton was important to the war effort.59 Of the sixty correspondents,
not one reported the story.60 The silence held until late November when
radio commentator Drew Pearson heard about it and “decided it was time
to let loose on” Patton.61 The resulting scoop became front-page news.
As one newspaper observed, it was a slap “heard around the world.”62
What was lost in the media coverage and later historical scholarship
was Patton’s belief that shell shock was a medical condition, which
his later statements demonstrate. As he obeyed Eisenhower’s order
to apologize he informed the medical personnel “that he had always
regarded cases of ‘shell shock’ as being most tragic” and his intension was
to shame the soldiers “to try to snap them out of it.”63 He could not resist
adding, however, that the medical personnel should “be very careful
in handling such cases so that we wouldn’t be taken in by cowards and
malingerers.”64 On December 21, 1944, Hughes wrote Patton suggesting
combat officers who were relieved for combat exhaustion (shell shock)
should be examined by a doctor to determine if the officer could be
saved by sending him on leave.65 Patton replied Hughes’s suggestions
were being acted on and “Commanders are being directed to require an
examination by a medical officer in all cases involving the relief of combat
officers as the result of combat exhaustion when there is a probability
that reclassification may be necessary.” He added, “Where such action
is indicated, the officer will of course be disposed of through medical
channels or given the proper treatment including a leave if that appears
desirable.”66 These statements suggest Patton not only believed in shell
shock but thought it could be treated without physical and verbal abuse.
Patton believed shell shock was a genuine medical condition, but the
two privates he slapped were not suffering from it. He had no problem
with soldiers who had lost control of their minds and actions being
treated in hospitals. This was the definition he and other US generals
who had served in World War I understood. Yet the two soldiers he
57      Butcher diary, August 17, 1943, box 167, PPPF.
58      Eisenhower to Patton, letter, August 17, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
59      Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 182.
60      Quentin Reynolds, By Quentin Reynolds (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 297.
61      Herman Klurfeld, Behind the Lines: The World of Drew Pearson (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1968), 79.
62      Lee Carson, “Patton’s Wife Offers No Alibi for ‘Tough Perfectionist’,” Washington Post,
November 15, 1943.
63      “Statement of Captain Henry A. Carr,” September 14, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
64      Currier, memorandum, September 7, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
65      Hughes to Patton, letter, December 21, 1944, folder 18, box 33, GSPP.
66      Patton to Hughes, letter, December 30, 1944, folder 18, box 33, GSPP.
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slapped were in control of themselves enough to explain their condition
to him. In these cases, the general believed, the soldiers must be made
to overcome their affliction by shame, anger, and physical abuse. His
actions, however, led most of his friends and family to conclude Patton
did not believe shell shock was a genuine medical condition.
In the rush of historians, journalists, and colleagues to defend or
condemn Patton, the subtle distinctions of his views were lost. Patton’s
actions hardly had universal support in the army’s officer corps. His
old friend John J. Pershing harshly and publicly criticized Patton’s
behavior.67 Nevertheless, many of his colleagues agreed, though usually
privately, with Patton’s definition of shell shock and the need to prevent
malingering. Former Army Chief of Staff Charles P. Summerall wrote
Patton that the incident was trifling and he remembered soldiers
migrating to the rear and being coddled in hospitals during World War
I. “Such cowards used to be shot, but now they are encouraged,” wrote
Summerall. “Only those who carry the responsibility of winning battles
know the difficulty of making men fight.”68 Summerall’s last observation
points to the struggle of making soldiers perform in combat during
World War II and the concern the US Army leadership had about the
problem. Instead of an isolated incident, Patton’s actions more accurately
demonstrate one general’s answer to a complex and universal dilemma.
The modern military leader can draw several lessons from the
slapping incidents. First, commanders must still balance medical needs
with military necessities. In recent years, the great focus in military
psychological health has been PTSD. According to the US Department
of Veterans Affairs, between 11 and 20 percent of veterans of the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq suffer from PTSD.69 Such a wide gap in the
statistics speaks to the controversy over who has PTSD and fears it
is underdiagnosed.70 Conversely, critics have worried the publicity
surrounding PTSD may lead to overdiagnosis, a concern shared by some
in the medical profession about shell shock during World War II.71 The
costs are huge, and the military budget is finite. The army that won
World War II was largely made up of draftees, but the military of today
is comprised of professionals trained at a great cost. A soldier out of
action because of PTSD is a major loss and difficult to replace. Finding
the correct balance between medical cost and military resources is an
ongoing challenge.
Second, like shell shock, the definition of PTSD and what
characterizes it changes over time. What was accepted as shell shock
67      Blumenson, Patton Papers, 379.
68      Blumenson, Patton Papers, 378.
69      “How Common Is PTSD in Veterans?,” US Department of Veterans Affairs, accessed July
23, 2019.
70      Michael P. Fisher, “PTSD in the U.S. Military, and the Politics of Prevalence,” Social Science
& Medicine 115 (2014), 1.
71      David J. Morris with Thomas E. Ricks, “Can Drone Operators Get PTSD?,” Foreign Policy,
June 2, 2015; and Norman Q. Brill, “Hospitalization and Disposition,” in Neuropsychiatry in World War
II, vol. 1, ed. Albert J. Glass and Robert J. Bernucci (Washington, DC: Department of the Army,
1973), 231.
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for Patton and many of his contemporaries in World War I was very
different than that in World War II. Yet, the medical definition had
expanded to include people who once would have been viewed as simply
tired or frightened. Today, PTSD is often used in the popular vernacular
to cover a wide range of traumatic experiences. Military officers need
to be cognitive of this and work with medical personnel to provide the
best treatment.
Finally, the slapping incidents are a reminder of the difficulty of
keeping an army fighting. The ultimate duty of a commander is to achieve
victory. To do this and keep casualties to a minimum requires keeping
as many soldiers on duty as possible. One of the least remembered, but
most remarkable, facts about the second slapping incident is the reaction
of the other soldiers in the hospital, many of whom apparently approved
of Patton’s actions. Leon Luttrell recalled, “none of us felt sorry for the
soldier” Patton slapped.72 Donald Bennett, heard the commotion in the
next tent and remembered his fellow patients cheered Patton as he left,
adding, “There wasn’t a frontline soldier who had the slightest sympathy
for the kid Patton slapped.” To Bennett, one soldier’s feelings seemed
inconsequential to the death he had seen in Sicily, and he believed Patton
meant to instill a message for his army to “show backbone, and get the
job done.” 73
Patton’s actions were harsh and counterproductive. Even he
recognized “my motive was correct because one cannot permit skulking
to exist. It is just like a communicable disease.” But he added, “I admit
freely that my method was wrong and I shall make what amends I can.” 74
He had not acted out of deliberate cruelty, but was instead motivated by
a desire to achieve victory and save the lives of his soldiers.

72      David A. Lande, I Was With Patton: First Person Accounts of WWII in George S. Patton’s Command
(St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2002), 91.
73      Bennett, Honor Untarnished, 148–49.
74      [Patton] diary, August 20, 1943, box 3, GSPP.

